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Information theory is a mathematical theory of learning with deep con-
nections with topics as diverse as artificial intelligence, statistical physics,
and biological evolution. Many primers on information theory paint a broad
picture with relatively little mathematical sophistication, while many others
develop specific application areas in detail. In contrast, these informal notes
aim to outline some elements of the information-theoretic “way of think-
ing,” by cutting a rapid and interesting path through some of the theory’s
foundational concepts and results. They are aimed at practicing systems
scientists who are interested in exploring potential connections between in-
formation theory and their own fields. The main mathematical prerequisite
for the notes is comfort with elementary probability, including sample spaces,
conditioning, and expectations.
We take the Kullback-Leibler divergence as our most basic concept, and
then proceed to develop the entropy and mutual information. We discuss
some of the main results, including the Chernoff bounds as a characterization
of the divergence; Gibbs’ Theorem; and the Data Processing Inequality. A
recurring theme is that the definitions of information theory support natural
theorems that sound “obvious” when translated into English. More pithily,
“information theory makes common sense precise.” Since the focus of the
notes is not primarily on technical details, proofs are provided only where
the relevant techniques are illustrative of broader themes. Otherwise, proofs
and intriguing tangents are referenced in liberally-sprinkled footnotes. The
notes close with a highly nonexhaustive list of references to resources and
other perspectives on the field.
∗pchodrow@mit.edu
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1 Why Information Theory?
Briefly, information theory is a mathematical theory of learning with rich
connections to physics, statistics, and biology. Information-theoretic meth-
ods quantify complexity and predictability in systems, and make precise
how observing one feature of a system assists in predicting other features.
Information-theoretic thinking helps to structure algorithms; describe pro-
cesses in natural and engineered systems; and draw surprising connections
between seemingly disparate fields.
Formally, information theory is a subfield of probability, the mathematical
study of uncertainty and randomness. Information theory is distinctive in
its emphasis on properties of probability distributions that are independent
of how those distributions are represented. Because of this representation-
independence, information-theoretic quantities often have claim to be the
most “fundamental” properties of a system or problem, governing its com-
plexity, learnability, and intrinsic randomness.
In the original formulation of Shannon (1948), information theory is a
theory of communication: specifically, the transmission of a signal of some
given complexity over an unreliable channel, such as a telephone line cor-
rupted by a certain amount of white noise. Here we will emphasize a slightly
different role for information theory, as a theory of learning more generally.
This emphasis is consistent with the original formulation, since the com-
munication problem may be viewed as the problem of the message receiver
learning the intent of the sender based on the potentially corrupted trans-
mission. However, the emphasis on learning allows us to more easily glimpse
some of the rich connections of information theory to other disciplines. Spe-
cial consideration in these notes will be given to statistical motivations for
information-theoretic concepts. Theoretical statistics is the mathematical
design of methods for learning from data; information-theoretic considera-
tions determine when such learning is possible and to what extent. We will
close with a connection to physics; some connections to biology are cited in
the references.
2 Why Not Start with Entropy?
Entropy is easily the information-theoretic concept with the widest popular
currency, and many expositions take entropy as their starting point. We will,
however, choose a different point of departure and derive entropy along the
way. Our primary object is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between
two distributions, also called in some contexts the relative entropy, relative
information, or free energy.1 Why start with the divergence? Well, there’s a
1For the remainder of these notes I’ll stick with “divergence” – though there are many other interesting
objects called “divergences” in mathematics, we won’t be discussing any of them here, so no confusion
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simple reason – while we’ll focus on discrete random variables here, we’d like
to develop a theory that, wherever possible, applies to continuous random
variables as well. The divergence is well-defined for both discrete random
variables and continuous ones; that is, if p and q are two continuous dis-
tributions satisfying certain regularity properties, then d(p, q) is a uniquely
determined, nonnegative real number whether p and q are discrete or con-
tinuous. In contrast, the natural definition of entropy (so called differential
entropy) for continuous random variables has two bad behaviors. First, it
can be negative, which is undesirable for a measure of uncertainty. Second,
and arguably worse, the differential entropy is not even uniquely defined.
There are multiple ways to describe the same continuous distribution – for
example, the following three distributions are the same:
1. “The Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance 1.”
2. “The Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.”
3. “The Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and second moment equal to
1.”
Technically, the act of switching from one of these descriptions to another
can be viewed as a smooth change of coordinates2 in the space of distribution
parameters. For example, we move from the first description to the second
by changing coordinates from (µ, σ2) to (µ, σ), which we can do by applying
the function f(x, y) = (x,
√
y). Regrettably, the differential entropy is not
invariant under such coordinate changes – change the way you describe the
distribution, and the differential entropy changes as well. This is undesirable.
The foundations of our theory should be independent of the contingencies of
how we describe the distributions under study. The divergence passes this
test in both discrete and continuous cases; the differential entropy does not.3
Since we can define the entropy in terms of the divergence in the discrete
case, we’ll start with the divergence and derive the entropy along the way.
3 Introducing the Divergence
It is often said that the divergence d(p, q) between distributions p and q
measures how “surprised” you are if you think the state of the world is q but
then measure it to be p. However, this idea of surprise isn’t always explained
or made precise. To motivate the KL divergence, we’ll start from a somewhat
unusual beginning – the Chernoff bounds – that makes exact the role that
the divergence plays in governing how surprised you ought to be.
should arise.
2I.e. a diffeomorphism: smooth, invertible functions on coordinate space whose inverses are also smooth.
3It is possible to define alternative notions of entropy that at-
tempt to skirt these issues; however, they have their own difficulties.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limiting_density_of_discrete_points
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Let’s begin with a simple running example. You are drawing from an
(infinite) deck of standard playing cards, with four card suits {♠,♣,♦,♥}
and thirteen card values {1, . . . , 13}. We’ll view the sets of possible val-
ues as alphabets: X = {♠,♣,♦,♥} is the alphabet of possible suits, and
Y = {1, . . . , 13} the alphabet of possible values. We’ll let X and Y be the
corresponding random variables, so for each realization, X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y.
Suppose that I have a prior belief that the distribution of suits in the
deck is uniform. My belief about the suits can be summarized by a vector
q = (14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ). It’s convenient to view q as a single point in the probability
simplex PX of all valid probability distributions over X .
Definition 1 (Probability Simplex). For any finite alphabet X with |X| = m,
the probability simplex PX is the set
PX ,
{
q ∈ Rm |
∑
i
qi = 1, qi ≥ 0 ∀i
}
.
Remark. It’s helpful to remember that PX is an m − 1-dimensional space;
the “missing” dimension is due to the constraint
∑
i qi = 1. When m = 3,
PX is an equilateral triangle; when m = 4 a tetrahedron, and so on.
If q is your belief, you would naturally expect that, if you drew enough
cards, the observed distribution of suits would be “close” to q, and that if
you could draw infinitely many cards, the distribution would indeed converge
to q. Let’s make this precise: define pˆn ∈ PX to be the distribution of suits
you observe after pulling n cards. It’s important to remember that pˆ is a
random vector, which changes in each realization. But it would be reasonable
to expect that pˆ→ q as n→∞, and indeed this is true almost surely (with
probability 1) according to the Strong Law of Large Numbers, if q is in fact
the true distribution of cards in the deck.
But what happens if you keep drawing cards and the observed distribution
pˆn is much different than your belief q? Then you would justifiably be sur-
prised, and your “level of surprise” can be quantified by the probability of
observing pˆn if the true distribution were q, which I’ll denote P(pˆn; q). We’d
naturally expect P(pˆn; q) to become small when n grows large. Indeed, there
is a quite strong result here – P(pˆn; q) decays exponentially in n, with a very
special exponent.
Definition 2 (Kullback-Leibler Divergence). For p, q ∈ PX , the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence of q from p is
d(p, q) ,
∑
x∈X
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
,
where we are using the conventions that log∞ = ∞, log 0 = −∞, 0/0 = 0,
and 0×∞ = 0.
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Theorem 1 (Chernoff Bounds). Suppose that the card suits are truly dis-
tributed according to p 6= q. Then,
e−nd(p,q)
(n+ 1)m
≤ P(pˆn; q) ≤ e−nd(p,q) .
So, the probability of observing pˆn when you thought the distribution was
q decays exponentially, with the exponent given by the divergence of your
belief q from the true distribution p. Another way to say this: ignoring
non-exponential factors,
− 1
n
logP(pˆn; q) ∼= d(p, q) ,
that is, d(p, q) is the minus the log of your average surprise per card drawn.
The Chernoff bounds thus provide firm mathematical content to the idea
that the divergence measures surprise.
To make this result concrete, suppose I start with the belief that the deck
is uniform over suits. So, my belief is q = (14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4) over the alphabet
{♠,♣,♦,♥}. Unbeknownst to me, you have removed all the black cards
from the deck, which therefore has true distribution p =
(
0, 0, 12 ,
1
2
)
. I draw
100 cards and record the suits. How surprised am I by the suit distribution
I observe? The divergence between my belief and the true deck distribution
is d(p, q) ≈ 0.69, so Theorem 1 states that the dominating factor in the
probability of my observing an empirical distribution close to p in 100 draws
is e−0.69×100 ≈ 10−30. I am quite surprised indeed!
Can you have “negative surprise?” Gibbs’ inequality states that the answer
is no:
Theorem 2 (Gibbs’ Inequality). For all p, q ∈ PX , it holds that d(p, q) ≥ 0,
with equality iff p = q.
In words, you can never have “negative surprise,” and you are only unsur-
prised if you what you observed is exactly what you expected.
Proof. There are lots of ways to prove Gibbs’ Inequality; here’s one with
Lagrange multipliers. Fix p ∈ PX . We’d like to show that the problem
min
q∈PX
d(p, q)
has value 0 and that this value is achieved at the unique point q = p. We
need two gradients: the gradient of d(p, q) with respect to q and the gradient
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of the implicit constraint g(q) ,
∑
x∈X q(x) = 1. The former is
∇qd(p, q) = ∇q
[∑
x∈X
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
]
= −∇q
[∑
x∈X
p(x) log q(x)
]
= −p⊘ q,
where p ⊘ q is the elementwise quotient of vectors, and where we recall the
convention 0/0 = 0. On the other hand,
∇qg(q) = 1,
the vector whose entries are all unity. The method of Lagrange multipliers
states that we should seek λ ∈ R such that
∇qd(p, q) = λ∇q(gq),
or
−p⊘ q = λ1,
from which it’s easy to see that the only solution is q = p and λ = −1.
It’s a quick check that the corresponding solution value is d(p, p) = 0, which
completes the proof.
Remark. Theorem 2 is the primary sense in which d behaves “like a distance”
on the simplex P. On the other hand, d is unlike a distance in that it is not
symmetric and does not satisfy the triangle inequality.4
Let’s close out this section by noting one of the many connections be-
tween the divergence and classical statistics. Maximum likelihood estimation
is a fundamental method of modern statistical practice; tools from linear
regression to neural networks may be viewed as likelihood maximizers. The
divergence offers a particularly elegant formulation of maximum likelihood
estimation: likelihood maximization is the same as divergence min-
imization. Let θ be some statistical parameter, which may be multidimen-
sional; for example, in the context of fitting normal distributions, we may
have θ = (µ, σ2); in the context of regression, θ may be the regression co-
efficients β. Let pθX be the probability distribution over X with parameters
θ. Let {x1, . . . , xn} be a sequence of i.i.d. observations of X. Maximum
likelihood estimation encourages us to find the parameter θ such that
θ∗ = argmax
θ
n∏
i=1
pθX(xi) ,
4In fact, d is related to a “proper” distance metric on PX , which is usually called the Fisher In-
formation Metric and is the fundamental object of study in the field of information geometry
(Amari and Nagaoka, 2007).
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i.e. the parameter value that makes the data most probable. To express this
in terms of the divergence, we need just one more piece of notation: let pˆX be
the empirical distribution of observations of X. Then, it’s a slightly involved
algebraic exercise to show that the maximum likelihood estimation problem
can also be written
θ∗ = argmin
θ
d(pˆX , p
θ
X).
This is rather nice – maximum likelihood estimation consists in making the
parameterized distribution pθX as close as possible to the observed data dis-
tribution pˆX in the sense of the divergence.
5
4 Entropy
After having put it off for a while, let’s define the Shannon entropy. If
we think about the divergence as a (metaphorical) distance, the entropy
measures how close a distribution is to the uniform.
Definition 3 (Shannon Entropy). The Shannon entropy of p ∈ PX is
H(p) , −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x) .
When convenient, we will also use the notation H(X) to refer to the entropy
of a random variable X distributed according to p.
Theorem 3. The Shannon entropy is related to the divergence according to
the formula
H(p) = logm− d(p, u) , (1)
where m = |X | is the size of the alphabet X and where u is the uniform
distribution on X .6
Remark. This formula makes it easy to remember the entropy of the uniform
distribution – it’s just logm, where m is the number of possible choices. If
we are playing a game in which I draw a card from the infinite deck, the suit
of the card is uniform, and the entropy of the suit distribution is therefore
H(X) = log 4 = 2 log 2.
5This result is another hint at the beautiful geometry of the divergence: the operation of minimizing a
distance-like measure is often called “projection.” Maximum likelihood estimation thus consists in a
kind of statistical projection.
6Here is as good a place as any to note that for discrete random variables, the divergence can also be
defined in terms of the entropy. Technically, d is the Bregman divergence induced by the Shannon
entropy, and can be characterized by the equation
d(p, q) = − [H(p)−H(q)− 〈∇qH,p− q〉] .
Intuitively, d(p, q) is minus the approximation loss associated with estimating the difference in entropy
between p and q using a first-order Taylor expansion centered at q. This somewhat artificial-seeming
construction turns out to lead in some very interesting directions in statistics and machine learning.
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Remark. In words, d(p, u) is your surprise if you thought the suit distribution
was uniform and then found it was in fact p. If you are relatively unsurprised,
then p is very close to uniform. Indeed, Gibbs’ inequality (Theorem 2) im-
mediately implies that H(p) assumes its largest value of logm exactly when
p = u.
Remark. Theorem 3 provides one useful insight into why the Shannon entropy
does not generalize naturally to continuous distributions. Whereas equation
(1) expresses the entropy in terms of the uniform distribution on X , there
can be no analogous formula for continuous random variables on R because
there is no uniform distribution on R.
A Bayesian Interpretation of Entropy
The construction of the entropy in terms of the divergence is fairly natural.
We use the divergence to measure how close p is to the uniform distribution,
flip the sign so that high entropy distributions are more uniform, and add
a constant term to make the entropy nonnegative. This formulation of the
entropy turns out to have another interesting characterization in the context
of Bayesian prediction. In Bayesian prediction, I will pull a single card from
the deck. Before I do, I ask you to provide a distribution p over the alphabet
{♠,♣,♦,♥} representing your prediction about the suit of the card I pulled.
As examples, you can choose p = (1, 0, 0, 0) if you are certain that the suite
will be ♠, or p = (14 , 14 , 14 , 14) to express maximal ignorance. After you guess,
I pull the card, obtaining a sample x ∈ X , and reward you based on the
quality of your prediction relative to the outcome x. I do this based on a loss
function f(p, x); after your guess I give you f(p, x) dollars, say. If we assume
that my aim is to encourage you to (a) report your true beliefs about the deck
and (b) reward you based only on what happened (i.e. not on what could
have happened), then there is essentially only one appropriate loss function
f , which turns out to be closely related to the entropy. More formally,
Definition 4. A loss function f is proper if, for any alphabet Y and random
variable Y on Y,
pX|Y=y = argmin
p∈PX
E[f(p, x)|Y = y].
Remark. In this definition, it’s useful to think of Y as some kind of “side
information” or “additional data.” For example, Y could be my telling you
that the card I pulled is a red card, which could influence your predictive
distribution. When f is proper, you have an incentive to factor that into
your predictive distribution. While it may feel that “of course” you should
factor this in, not all loss functions encourage you to do so. For example, if
f is constant, then you have no incentive to use Y at all, since each guess
is just as good as any other. A proper loss function guarantees that you
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can maximize your payout (minimize your loss) by completely accounting
for all available data when forming your prediction, which should therefore
be pX|Y=y. Thus, a proper loss function ensures that the Bayesian prediction
game is “honest”.
Definition 5. A loss function f is local if f(p, x) = ψ(p, p(x)) for some
function ψ.
Remark. The function f is local iff f can be written as a function only of
my prediction p and how much probabilistic weight I put on the event that
actually occurred – not events that “could have happened” but didn’t. Thus,
a proper loss function ensures that the Bayesian prediction game is “fair.”
Somewhat amazingly, the log loss function given by f(p, x) = − log p(x) is
the only loss function that is both proper and local (both honest and fair),
up to an affine transformation.
Theorem 4 (Uniqueness of the Log-Loss). Let f be a local and proper reward
function. Then, f(p, x) = A log p(x) + B for some constants A < 0 and
B ∈ R.
Without loss of generality, we’ll take A = −1 and B = 0. The entropy in
this context occurs as the expected log-loss when you know the distribution
of suits in the deck. If you know, say, that the proportions in the deck are
p = (14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ) and need to formulate your predictive distribution, Theorem
4 implies that your best guess is just p, since you have no additional side
information. Then....
Definition 6 (Entropy, Bayesian Characterization). The (Shannon) en-
tropy of p is your minimal expected loss when playing the Bayesian prediction
game in which the true distribution of suits is p.
Remark. To see that this definition is consistent with the one we saw before,
we can simply compute the expectation:
E[f(p,X)] = E[− log p(X)]
= −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x),
which matches Definition 3. The second inequality follows from the fact that,
if you are playing optimally, p is both the true distribution of X and your
best predictive distribution.
5 Conditional Entropy
The true magic of probability theory is conditional probabilities, which for-
malize the idea of learning: P(A|B) represents my best belief about A given
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what I know about B. While the Shannon entropy itself is quite interesting,
information theory really starts becoming a useful framework for thinking
probabilistically when we formulate the conditional entropy, which encodes
the idea of learning as a process of uncertainty reduction.
In this section and the next, we’ll need to keep track of multiple random
variables and distributions. To fix notation, we’ll let pX ∈ PX be the distri-
bution of a discrete random variable X on alphabet X , pY ∈ PY the distribu-
tion of a discrete random variable Y on alphabet Y, and pX,Y ∈ PX×Y their
joint distribution on alphabet X ×Y. Additionally, we’ll denote the product
distribution of marginals as pX ⊗ pY ∈ PX×Y ; that is, (pX ⊗ pY )(x, y) =
pX(x)pY (y).
Definition 7 (Conditional Entropy). The conditional entropy of X given
Y is
H(X|Y ) ,
∑
x,y∈X×Y
pX,Y (x, y) log pX|Y (x|y) .
Remark. It might seem as though H(X|Y ) ought to be defined as
H˜(X|Y ) =
∑
x,y∈X×Y
pX|Y (x|y) log pX|Y (x|y) ,
which looks more symmetrical. However, a quick think makes clear that this
definition isn’t appropriate, because it doesn’t include any information about
the distribution of Y . If Y is concentrated around some very informative (or
uninformative) values, then H˜ won’t notice that some values of Y are more
valuable than others.
In the framework of our Bayesian interpretation of the entropy above, the
conditional entropy is your expected reward in the guessing game assuming
you receive some additional side information. For example, consider playing
the suit-guessing game in the infinite deck of cards. Recall that the suit
distribution is uniform, with entropy H(X) = H(u) = 2 log 2. Suppose now
that you get side information – when I draw the card from the deck, before
I ask you to guess the suit, I tell you the color (black or red). Since for each
color there are just two possible suits, the entropy decreases. Formally, if
X is the suit and Y the color, it’s easy to compute that H(X|Y ) = log 2.
Comparing to our previous calculation that H(X) = 2 log 2, we see that
knowing the color reduces your uncertainty by half.
The conditional entropy is somewhat more difficult to express in terms of
the divergence, but it does have a useful relationship with the (unconditional)
entropy.
Theorem 5. The conditional entropy is related to the unconditional entropy
as
H(X|Y ) = H(X,Y )−H(Y ),
where H(X,Y ) is the entropy of the distribution pX,Y .
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Remark. This theorem is easy to remember, because it looks like what you
get by recalling the definition of the conditional probability and taking logs:
pX|Y (x|y) =
pX,Y (x, y)
pY (y)
.
Indeed, take logs and compute the expectations over X and Y to prove the
theorem directly. Another way to remember this theorem is to just say it
out: the uncertainty you have about X given that you’ve been told Y is
equal to the uncertainty you had about both X and Y , less the uncertainty
that was resolved when you learned Y .
From this theorem, it’s a quick use of Gibbs’ Inequality to show:
Theorem 6 (Side Information Reduces Uncertainty).
H(X|Y ) ≤ H(X).
That is, knowing Y can never make you more uncertain about X, only
less. This makes sense – after all, if Y is not actually informative about X,
you can just ignore it.
Theorem 6 implies that H(X) − H(X|Y ) ≥ 0. This difference quantifies
how much Y reduces uncertainty about X; if H(X) − H(X|Y ) = 0, for
example, then H(X|Y ) = H(X) and it is natural to say that Y “carries no
information” about X. We encode the idea of information as uncertainty
reduction in the next section.
6 Information Three Ways
Thus far, we’ve seen two concepts – divergence and entropy – that play fun-
damentals role in information theory. But neither of them exactly resemble
an idea of “information,” so how does the theory earn its name? Our brief
note at the end of the last section suggests that we think about informa-
tion as a relationship between two variables X and Y , in which knowing Y
decreases our uncertainty (entropy) about X. As it turns out, the idea of
information that falls out of this motivation is a remarkably useful one, and
can be formulated in many interesting and different ways. Let’s start by
formalizing this notion:
Definition 8 (Mutual Information). The mutual information I(X,Y ) in
Y about X is
I(X,Y ) , H(X)−H(X|Y ).
In the context of the Bayesian guessing game, I(X,Y ) is the “value” of
being told the suit color, compared to having to play the game without
that information. From our calculations above, in the suit-guessing game,
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = 2 log 2− log 2 = log 2.
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Let’s now express mutual information in two other ways. Remarkably,
these follow directly via simple algebra, but each identity provides a new
way to think about the meaning of the mutual information.
Theorem 7. The mutual information may also be written as:
I(X,Y ) = d(pX,Y , pX ⊗ pY ) (2)
= EY [d(pX|Y , pX)] (3)
We’ll start by unpacking equation (2), which expresses the mutual infor-
mation I(X,Y ) as the divergence between the true joint distribution pX,Y
and the product distribution pX ⊗ pY . Recall that pX ⊗ pY is what the dis-
tribution of X and Y would be, were they independent random variables.
Combining this observation with Gibbs’ inequality, we obtain the following
important facts:
Corrolary 1. I(X,Y ) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if X and Y are inde-
pendent.
So, I(X,Y ) is something like a super-charged correlation coefficient, in that
it measures the degree of statistical dependence between X and Y . However,
the mutual information is more powerful than the correlation coefficient in
two ways. First, I(X,Y ) detects all kinds of statistical relationships, not
just linear ones. Second, while the correlation coefficient can vanish for
dependent variables, this never happens for the mutual information. Zero
mutual information implies dependence, period. As a quick illustration, it’s
not hard to calculate or intuit that ifX is the suit color and Z is the numerical
value of the card pulled, then I(X,Z) = 0. Intuitively, if we were playing the
suit-guessing game and I offered to tell you the card’s face-value, you would
be rightly annoyed. That’s an unhelpful (“uninformative”) offer, because the
face-values and suit colors are independent.7
Equation (2) has another useful consequence. Since that formulation is
symmetric in X and Y ,
Corrolary 2. The mutual information is symmetric:
I(X,Y ) = I(Y,X) .
Now let’s unpack equation (3). One way to read this is as quantifying
the danger of ignoring available information: d(pX|Y=y, pX) is how surprised
7So, why don’t we just dispose of correlation coefficients and use I(X,Y ) instead? Well, correlation
coefficients can be estimated from data relatively simply and are fairly robust to error. In contrast,
I(X,Y ) requires that we have reasonably good estimates of the joint distribution pX,Y , which is not
usually available. Furthermore, it can be hard to distinguish I(X,Y ) = 10−6 from I(X,Y ) = 0,
and statistical tests of significance that address this problem are much more complex than those for
correlation coefficients.
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you would be if you ignored the information Y = y and instead kept using
pX as your belief. If I told you that the deck contained only red cards, but
you chose to ignore this and continue guessing u =
(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
)
as your guess,
you would be surprised to keep seeing red cards turn up draw after draw.
Formulation (3) expresses the mutual information as the expected surprise
you would experience by ignoring your available side information Y , with
the expectation taken over all the possible values the side information could
assume. While this formulation may seem much more opaque than (2), it
turns out to be remarkably useful when thinking geometrically, as it expresses
the mutual information as the average “distance” between the marginal pX
and the conditionals pX|Y . Pursuing this thought usefully expresses the
mutual information as something like the “moment of inertia” for the joint
distribution pX,Y .
7 Why Information Shrinks
The famous 2nd Law of Thermodynamics states that, in a closed system,
entropy increases. The physicists’ concept of entropy is closely related to but
slightly different from the information theorist’s concept, and we therefore
won’t make a direct attack on the 2nd Law in these notes. However, there
is a close analog of the 2nd Law that gives much of the flavor and can be
formulated in information theoretic terms. Whereas the 2nd Law states
that entropy grows, the Data Processing Inequality states that information
shrinks.
Theorem 8 (Data Processing Inequality). Let X and Y be random variables,
and let Z = g(Y ), where g is any function g : Y → Z. Then,
I(X,Z) ≤ I(X,Y ).
This is not the most general possible form of the Data Processing Inequal-
ity, but it has the right flavor. The meaning of this theorem is both “obvious”
and striking in its generality. If you are using Y to predict X, then any pro-
cessing you do to Y can only reduce your predictive power. Data processing
can enable tractable computations; reduce the impact of noise in your ob-
servations; and improve your visualizations. The one thing it can’t do is
create information out of thin air. No amount of processing is a substitute
for having sufficient, salient data.
We’ll pursue the proof the Data Processing Inequality, as the steps are
quite enlightening. First, we need the conditional mutual information:
Definition 9 (Conditional Mutual Information). The conditional mutual
information of X and Y given Z is
I(X,Y |Z) =
∑
z∈Z
pZ(z)d(pX,Y |Z=z, pX|Z=z ⊗ pY |Z=z).
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The divergence in the summand is naturally written I(X,Y |Z = z), in
which case we have I(X,Y |Z) = ∑z∈Z pZ(z)I(X,Y |Z = z), which has the
form of an expectation of mutual informations conditioned on specific val-
ues of Z. The conditional mutual information is naturally understood as
the value of knowing Y for the prediction of X, given that you already
know Z. Somewhat surprisingly, both of the cases I(X,Y |Z) > I(X,Y ) and
I(X,Y |Z) < I(X,Y ) may hold; that is, knowing Z can either increase or
decrease the value of knowing Y in the context of predicting X.
Theorem 9 (Chain Rule of Mutual Information). We have
I(X, (Y,Z)) = I(X,Z) + I(X,Y |Z).
Remark. The notation I(X, (Y,Z)) refers to the (regular) mutual information
between X and the random variable (Y,Z), which we can regard as a single
random variable on the alphabet Y × Z.
Proof. We can compute directly, dividing up sums and remembering relations
like pX,Y,Z(x, y, z) = pX,Y |Z(x, y|z)pZ(z). Omitting some of the more tedious
algebra,
I(X, (Y,Z)) = d(pX,Y,Z , pX ⊗ pY,Z)
=
∑
x,z∈X×Z
pX,Y |Z(x, z) log
pX,Z(x, z)
pX(x)pZ(z)
+
∑
x,y,z∈X×Y×Z
pZ(z)pX,Y |Z(x, y|z) log
pX,Y |Z(x, y|z)
pY |Z(y|z)pX|Z(x|z)
= I(X,Z) + I(X,Y |Z) ,
as was to be shown.
As always, the Chain Rule has a nice interpretation if you think about
estimating X by first learning Z, and then Y . At the end of this process,
you know both Y and Z, and therefore have information I(X, (Y,Z)). This
information splits into two pieces: the information you gained when you
learned Z, and the information you gained when you learned Y after already
knowing Z.
We are now ready to prove the Data Processing Inequality.8
Proof. Since Z = g(Y ), that is, is a function of Y alone, we have that
Z ⊥ X|Y , that is, given Y , Z and X are independent.9 So, I(X,Z|Y ) = 0.
8Proof borrowed from http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~aarti/Class/10704/lec2-dataprocess.pdf
9In fact, Z ⊥ X|Y is often taken as the hypothesis of the Data Processing inequality rather than
Z = g(Y ), as it is somewhat weaker and sufficient to prove the result.
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On the other hand, using the chain rule in two ways,
I(X, (Y,Z)) = I(X,Z) + I(X,Y |Z)
= I(X,Y ) + I(X,Z|Y ).
Since I(X,Z|Y ) = 0 by our argument above, we obtain I(X,Y ) = I(X,Z)+
I(X,Y |Z). Since I(X,Y |Z) is nonnegative by Gibbs’ inequality, we conclude
that I(X,Z) ≤ I(X,Y ), as was to be shown.
The Data Processing Inequality states that, in the absence of additional
information sources, processing generically leaves you with less information
than you started. The 2nd Law of Thermodynamics states that, in the
absence of additional energy sources, the system dynamics leave you with
less order than you started. These formulations suggest a natural parallel
between the concepts of information and order, and therefore a natural par-
allel between the two theorems. We’ll close out this note with an extremely
simplistic-yet-suggestive way to think about this.
Let X0 and Y0 each be random variables reflecting the possible locations
and momenta of two particles at time t = 0. We’ll assume (a) that the
particles don’t interact, but that (b) the experimenter has placed the two
particles very close to each other with similar momenta. Thus, the initial
configuration of the system is highly ordered, reflected by I(X0, Y0) > 0. If
we knew Y0, then we’d also significantly reduce our uncertainty about X0.
How does this system evolve over time? We’re assuming no interactions,
so each of the particles evolve separately according to some short-timescale
dynamics, which we can write X1 = gx(X0) and Y1 = gy(Y0). Using the data
processing inequality twice, we have
I(X1, Y1) ≤ I(X0, Y1) ≤ I(X0, Y0).
Thus, the dynamics tend to reduce information. Of course, we can complicate
this picture in various ways, by considering particle interactions or external
potentials, either of which require a more sophisticated analysis. The full
2nd Law, which is beyond the scope of these notes, is most appropriate for
considering these cases.
8 Some Further Reading
Those interested in these topics have many opportunities to explore them in
more detail. The below is a short list of some of the resources I have found
most intriguing and useful, in addition to those cited in the introduction.
Information Theory “in General”
1. Claude Shannon’s original work (Shannon, 1948).
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2. Shannon’s entertaining information-theoretic study of written English
(Shannon, 1951).
3. The text of Cover and Thomas (1991) is the standard modern overview
of the field for both theorists and practitioners.
4. Colah’s blog post “Visual Information Theory” at http://colah.github.io/posts/2015-09-Visual-Information/
is both entertaining and extremely helpful for getting basic intuition
around the relationship between entropy and communication.
Information Theory, Statistics, and Machine Learning
1. An excellent and entertaining introduction to these topics is the already-
mentioned MacKay (2003).
2. Those who want to further explore will likely enjoy Csiszar and Shields
(2004), but I would suggest doing this one after MacKay.
3. Readers interested in pursuing the Bayesian development of entropy
much more deeply may enjoy Bernardo and Smith (2008), which pro-
vides an extremely thorough development of decision theory with a
strong information-theoretic perspective.
4. The notes for the course “Information Processing and Learning” at
Carnegie-Mellon’s famous Machine Learning department are excellent
and accessible; find them at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~aarti/Class/10704/lecs.html
Information Theory, Physics, and Biology
1. Marc Harper has some intriguing papers in which he views biological
evolutionary dynamics as learning processes through the framework of
information theory; a few are (Harper, 2009, 2010).
2. John Baez and his student Blake Pollard wrote a very nice and easy-
reading review article of the role of information concepts in biological
and chemical systems (Baez and Pollard, 2016).
3. More generally, John Baez’s blog is a treasure-trove of interesting vi-
gnettes and insights on the role that information plays in the physical
and biological worlds: https://johncarlosbaez.wordpress.com/category/information-and-entropy/.
For a more thoroughly worked-out connection between information dis-
sipation and the Second Law of Thermodynamics, see this one: https://johncarlosbaez.wordpress.com/2012/10/08/the-mathematical-origin-of-irreversibility/.
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